I. INTRODUCTION
Why is it that a growing number of studies are devoted to examining individual environmental preferences, proposing for example, that individuals' environmental morale or attitudes could help to reduce environmental degradation or the problems of free riding associated with public goods (see, for example Frey and Stutzer, 2006) ? One motivation for such a suggestion is that control and deterrence models predict a level of compliance far lower than that actually observed. In many countries, the level of government control is too low to explain the high degree of environmental compliance.
For example, it is common practice for the majority of park visitors to carefully collect and wrap their refuse before purposely driving to the bin and disposing of it. This action incurs a personal cost that could have been avoided by simply leaving the rubbish behind, considering there is no threat of omnipresent police officers. In an attempt to resolve this puzzle of compliance, researchers have identified social norms and the strength of these norms as an explanation for the high degree of compliance. Similarly, a high level of cooperation can also be found in experiments. According to Ochs and Roth (1989) and Roth (1995) , many ultimatum experiments have shown that the modal offer is (50, 50) , that the mean offer is somewhere around (40, 60) , and that the smaller the offer, the higher the probability that the offer will be rejected. Moreover, according to Ledyard (1995) and Davis and Holt (1993) , public good experiments indicate that, on average, subjects contribute between 40 and 60 percent of their endowment to a public good. Baldry (1987) identifies a need to revise the theory rather than questioning the experimental method.
However, there are few studies exploring empirically whether such pro-environmental 3 attitudes exert a positive effect on either environmental behavior or involvement in environmental organizations. The presence of such norms or environmental motivation influencing the willingness to contribute to the environment is especially useful in situations where it is extraordinarily expensive to arrange a regulatory enforcement regime. A desirable and positive side effect of voluntary compliance is that it lowers the cost of government operations aimed at ensuring public good provision (Slemrod 2002) .
Recent studies in the area of ecological economics have shown that social capital indeed influences transaction costs and also the effectiveness of public environmental policies (see Torgler and Garcia-Valiñas, 2007) . These results suggest that "environmental conflicts can be resolved by making collective choices that are implemented by establishing, changing or reaffirming governance institutions" (Paavola and Adger, 2005, p. 364) . It has furthermore been shown that the existence of social capital is important when dealing with new environmental scenarios, such as the threat of climate change, or for coping with the impact of environmental disasters, such as droughts or floods. The adaptive capability of societies is strongly linked to their ability to act collectively (Adger, 2003) .
The strength of this paper lies to explore the impact of environmental motivation on environmental behavior focusing on individuals' voluntary engagement in environmental organization and to test its impact with the use of a large micro data set covering 32 European countries. Such breadth and depth of data allows for exploration of the different channels through which individuals express their environment motivation through pro-environmental attitudes, and we capitalize on this opportunity by exploring 4 two variables that measure voluntary environmental participation (i.e. membership and voluntary work).
Section 2 of the paper first discusses the theoretical background and introduces a model of volunteering. Section 3 introduces the data set and the key variables. The empirical findings are presented in Section 4 and some concluding remarks are offered in Section 5.
II. THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Civil engagement in voluntary organizations is gaining increased attention from researchers; nonetheless the causes of environmental participation are still relatively unknown. The benefit of participation in voluntary activities is the creation of social output that would per se require paid resources (Freeman, 1997) . Pretty and Ward (2001) showed that the creation of active pro-environmental groups was significant for solving certain local environmental problems 1 . Our study will not only explore the gender, age and parental effect, but will also show who is likely to participate and whose priorities and values are best promoted by voluntary work in environmental organizations.
However, to date only a few studies have analyzed the factors impacting on the participation in environmental organizations (Mohai, 1992; Thompson and Barton, 1994; Martinez and McMullin, 2004) . The advantage of focusing on direct participation in environmental organizations is that individuals' behavior can be measured. Moreover, it 5 builds a bridge between the social capital literature that focuses on volunteering and the environmental literature on pro-environmental preferences.
The relevance of going beyond a neoclassical approach to understanding the reasons why citizens comply is demonstrated in the tax compliance literature and the analyses of tax paying behavior. Deterrence mechanisms alone cannot explain the level of observed compliance in this regard, (Torgler 2007) . Similarly, the level of formal deterrence is too low to explain why, for example, people do not litter more often. Social norms help to resolve such a puzzle, but more empirical evidence is required to determine whether environmental attitudes affect environmental actions, although previous literature has shown that values and attitudes can affect individual behavior (Ajzen and Fishbein, 1980; Lewis, 1982) . Thus, it is useful to explore whether the decision to participate in environmental organizations is driven by a set of attitudes and norms. Our theoretical model is strongly influenced by previous studies on altruism (Andreoni, 1990) and moral motivation in a public good environment (Brekke et al. 2003) .
A set of social norms that place a higher value on the environment increases the moral costs of not making a significant contribution to environmental quality. This may influence the decision to become active in an environmental organization. It is therefore a relevant issue to investigate whether differences in environmental attitudes across individuals and countries are reflected in any differences in real or observed behaviors.
Prevailing social norms thus tend to generate increased individual cooperation in public good situations and, in some instances, of private goods as well. Violation of social norms has negative consequences, such as internal sanctions (e.g. guilt, remorse) or external legal and social sanctions, such as gossip and ostracism. As Polinsky and Shavell 6 (2000) point out, the corresponding literature focuses on the influence that social norms have on individual behavior, and their role as a substitute for, or a supplement to, formal laws.
What is the meaning of 'pro-environmental behavior'? Kollmuss and Agyeman (2002) define it as actions taken by an individual in consciously seeking to minimize the negative impact of human activities on the environment and Jensen (2002) refers to those personal actions that are directly related to environmental improvements. Some daily activities, such as minimizing resource and energy consumption, reducing and recycling waste, or using public transport are private actions which contribute to the preservation of nature. In the same way, participation in environmental organizations can be seen as a kind of pro-environmental behavior and is highly relevant in ensuring the efficacy of environmental policies which require behavioral changes. When considered from an economic perspective, this behavior "exemplifies an individual's voluntary effort to provide an environmental public good" (Clark et al. 2003, p. 238) . Why do people take actions which result in collective benefits? While the traditional theoretical models predict a free-rider effect in the private provision of public goods, in practice the observed levels of provision are higher than anticipated (Andreoni, 1988; Piliavin and Charng, 1990) . Andreoni (1990, p. 465 ) provides an important model of impure altruism to understand donations to public goods. He assumes an economy with only one private good and one public good. The individual utility donation function depends on the consumption of a private good (x i ), the total amount of a public good (G), and the individual's gift to the public good (g i ). G, g i Improving the self-image induces an effort improvement towards beliefs that are perceived to be morally right.
We now introduce our model. We assume that individual's utility function is given by ) , , , ( 
The total amount of public good (environmental quality) depends on the public provision G p and private provision ∑ i i g , assuming identical individuals N:
where
is individual i's production function that depends on the level of voluntary participation in an environmental organization and an efficiency parameterα . Since we have identical
Ng . Therefore, we can write:
The utility from participating in a voluntary environmental organization ( i λ ) has the following form: 
Considering (2) to (6) leads to the following utility function: 
Eq. (9) suggests that environmental participation will increase with an increase in individual's perceived morally minimum environmental involvement. Thus, we can develop the following main hypothesis: with the intention of increasing future income through the acquisition of certain types of skills and through creating and developing networks that enhance their human capital (Hackl et al., 2007 Although we are not conducting a contingent valuation study (CV), these two questions offer the chance to explore our parameter m. However, the question is not free of problems and can be criticized in several ways. The statement is relatively vague:
"environmental pollution" is not clearly specified, and neither is the level of improvement. Similarly, the degree of income to be spent and the tax increase are not clarified. Therefore the respondents are not aware of how much they would hypothetically have to contribute 2 . The consequences of taxation are not mentioned and no information is provided regarding the extent to which income tax, value added tax or other taxes are supposed to increase. Thus, it is not clear who will bear the highest tax burden. Such unspecified payment schemes questions will increase the variance in responses, but on the other hand, may influence the willingness to contribute (Witzke and Urfei, 2001 ). Nevertheless, despite these possible shortcomings, an unspecified statement still helps to measure moral values and to reduce strategic behavior via influencing the quantity or quality of environmental goods. A more concrete scenario could encourage respondents to intentionally indicate false willingness to contribute values in order to match their own preferences (Hidano et al., 2005) . When neither specific goods nor quantitative values are used, the attributes of the environmental goods in question do not have to be thoroughly explained to be sure that respondents understand and respond with the appropriate willingness to spend income and accept an increase in taxes 3 .
In a next step we will explore a variable that measures environmental attitudes, but takes into account the possibility that people may have an incentive to free-ride (profit without incurring costs). We would predict that such a variable would lead to contradictory results (compared to the previous two variables):
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The Government has to reduce environmental pollution but it should not cost me any money (0=strongly disagree, 3=strongly agree)
Our multivariate analysis includes a vector of control variables, which are explained in the Appendix. Previous research in environmental economics and social norms demonstrates the relevance of considering such socio-demographic factors, formal and informal education and participation in an environmental organization (see Torgler and Garcia-Valiñas, 2007; Torgler, 2007) . We also differentiate between the two regions of Europe (i.e. Western and Eastern Europe) to account for effects of the reform process in the transition countries. The rapid collapse of institutional structures in Eastern European countries produced a vacuum in many, if not all, of these countries. This led to large social costs, especially in terms of worsening income inequalities, increasing poverty and poor institutional conditions resulting from uncertainty and high transaction costs.
Torgler ( 
Because EVS poses an identical set of questions to individuals in various
European countries, the survey provides a unique opportunity to empirically examine our hypotheses. We are able to employ a large data set considering 32 representative national samples. EVS has been designed as a wide-ranging survey, thereby reducing the danger of framing effects when compared with many other surveys that focus entirely on environmental questions. A further advantage of using this extensive data set is the ability to explore a large number of dependent variables.
Economists are increasingly using survey data in such areas of research as those dealing with social capital, corruption, happiness and tax compliance. These literatures explore the causes of attitudes (see, e.g., Frey and Stutzer, 2002; Brewer and Steenbergen, 2002; Uslaner, 2004; Brewer et al., 2004; and Chang and Chu, 2006 and Torgler, 2008) .
In general, a probit estimation is appropriate when working with information such as our two dependent variables measuring participation in environmental organizations.
We calculate the marginal effects to measure the quantitative effect of a variable, because the equation is nonlinear. Marginal effects indicate the change in the probability of individuals having a specific level of environmental preferences when the independent variable increases by one unit. Weighted estimates are conducted to make the samples correspond to the national distribution. 4 Furthermore, answers such as 'don't know' and missing values are eliminated in all estimations. Looking at the control variables we can see that women are more likely to be members of environmental organizations. Age is also positively correlated with being a member. Overall, the age group AGE 50-59 shows the strongest level of environmental participation (largest marginal effects). Having a child is negatively correlated with environmental participation, as time restrictions may act as a barrier to being involved in environmental organizations. Education and political interest, measured as political discussion, have a positive impact on the probability of being a member in an environmental organization. The time restriction argument may also be invoked when focusing on the marital status. Those who have never before been married, as well as those who are separated have the highest probability of participating in environmental organizations. Moreover, when taking into account the employment status, we observe part time employees are more likely to be members. There is also the tendency for selfemployed individuals to be more active in environmental organizations, probably because of the chance to improve their networks. On the other hand, the time restriction argument fails when it comes to the unemployed and retired, as they are less likely to be members than full-time employees. Finally, we also observe that people in Western Europe are more engaged in environmental organizations through membership participation. The marginal effects are quite large (more than 4 percentage points).
In Table 2 we explore a second aspect, namely doing unpaid work for environmental organizations. The results are quite similar. All the proxies for m in specification (5) to (7) are statistically significant. The strongest effects are again observable for the variable WILLINGNESS TO GIVE INCOME. However, it should be noted that compared to Table 1 we find lower quantitative effects. Specification (8) also shows that the coefficient for the variable CONTRIBUTE AT NO COSTS is not anymore statistically significant.
Looking at the control variables we find that compared to previously there is a negative correlation between environmental participation and being a woman. Thus, women are more likely to be a member in an environmental organization, but are less likely to do unpaid work. However, it can be argued that women might be more active in community-based and neighborhood organizations which address local environmental issues, while men are more likely to participate in formal environmental organizations.
Our survey question captures more of the latter than the former -for this reason, our results may not be in great conflict with findings to the contrary. Moreover, it should be noted that women (particularly younger women) have higher restrictions on participation in voluntary organizations, as they are often more heavily involved in time intensive household activities.
The age effect is now less visible, but we still observe that the AGE group 50-59 has the strongest probability of doing unpaid work. Also, the parental effect is now less obvious. On the other hand education and political interest have a significant and positive impact on environmental engagement. Moreover, we also observe that the "never married" individuals are the most active in environmental organizations. On the other hand, only retired people are significantly less willing than the full time-employed individuals to be active in environmental organizations through unpaid work. Finally we also observe that Western European citizens are more likely to be environmentally engaged. However, the effect is less strong than previously and the coefficient is no longer statistically significant in all specifications.
In the next two tables we extend the previous regression by including individuals' economic situation with two dummy variables. It should be noted that the number of observations in Table 3 and 4 strongly decreased after controlling for individuals' economic situation. The results indicate that a higher level of economic status leads to a higher probability of being a member and doing unpaid work in environmental organizations. It seems that wealthier citizens have a higher demand for a clean environment and less environmental damages and thus a stronger incentive to actively contribute to the environment by participating in a voluntary organization. Thus, such a result is not consistent with our Eq. (9). However, it should be noted that the economic situation variable may not only cover the current wage but also the accumulated wealth over time. Nevertheless, we observe that the results obtained previously remain robust. Hall et al., 1996) . Moreover, we show results of the Anderson-Rubin test indicating that the endogenous variables are jointly statistically significant. Table 5 reports that in all cases the Anderson canonical correlations LR test shows rejection of the null hypothesis, which indicates that the models are identified and that the instruments are relevant. The Anderson-Rubin test is also statistically significant and has the advantage of being robust to the presence of weak instruments.
Finally, we test in Table 6 and 7 whether the impact of environmental motivation on environmental involvement is driven by a subset of countries and present the results for the coefficients for environmental attitudes in both tables using the specifications in the first two tables (without controlling for the economic situation). Each table is a 20 summary of 96 regressions conducted within 32 countries. Table 6 focuses on membership participation, while Table 7 explores unpaid work as a dependent variable.
In general we observe differences between the countries. Table 6 shows that the coefficient of the variable WILLINGNESS TO GIVE INCOME is statistically significant in 25 out of 32 cases, and the strongest effect is observed for the Netherlands. An increase in the WILLINGNESS TO GIVE INCOME by one unit increases the probability of being a member in an environmental organization by almost 10 percentage points. A strong quantitative effect is also observed in Austria, Belgium, Denmark and Greece, however the effects are generally lower among Eastern European countries. We find a similar result for the variable WILLIGNESS TO INCREASE TAXES. The coefficient is statistically significant in 24 out 32 cases. The strongest effect can also be found in the Netherlands (9.1 percentage points), followed by Denmark (4.4 percentage points) and Greece (3.4 percentage points). The results are less strong when focusing on willingness to free-ride. However, here we also observe the strongest negative impact for the Netherlands (8.9 percentage points), followed by Denmark (4.2 percentage points) and Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 Notes: The reference group consists of MAN, AGE<30, NOT HAVE CHILDREN, MARRIED, FULL-TIME EMPLOYEE, EASTERN EUROPE. The symbols *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Robust standard errors. Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 Notes: The reference group consists of MAN, AGE<30, NOT HAVE CHILDREN, MARRIED, FULL-TIME EMPLOYEE, EASTERN EUROPE. The symbols *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Robust standard errors. Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 Notes: The reference group consists of MAN, AGE<30, LOWEST CLASS, NOT HAVE CHILDREN, MARRIED, FULL-TIME EMPLOYEE, EASTERN EUROPE. The symbols *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Robust standard errors. Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 Notes: The reference group consists of MAN, AGE<30, LOWEST CLASS, NOT HAVE CHILDREN, MARRIED, FULL-TIME EMPLOYEE, EASTERN EUROPE. The symbols *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Robust standard errors. Table. Regressions without the economic situation. The symbols *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Robust standard errors.
Belgium (4.2 percentage points). Looking at
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V. CONCLUSIONS This paper investigates whether environmental motivation affects environmental behavior. We therefore present first of a model that explores the relationship between environmental motivation and volunteering. In next step we test the hypothesis generated in the theoretical empirically. Behavioral engagement has been proxied through the participation in environmental organizations focusing on two aspects, namely being a member and doing unpaid work for environmental organizations. We also use three different proxies for environmental motivation, two of which measure pro-environmental attitudes, namely the willingness to give part of the own income to prevent environmental pollution, and to agree to an increase in taxes if the extra money is use to prevent environmental pollution. In addition, we have explored a variable that measures people's incentive to free-ride (profit without incurring costs). The motivation behind such a study is the observation that deterrence models fail to predict the relatively high level of compliance in various situations, ranging from tax compliance, over contributing to provide a public good, to not littering despite the low probability of getting caught and penalized. This paper provides support for the idea that environmental motivation indeed affects individuals' voluntary involvement in environmental organizations by using a large micro-data set covering not less than 32 different countries providing also a summary for every single country (almost 200 regressions). In addition, we have explored potential endogeneity problems. The results show robust findings and therefore indicate that attitudinal questions help to explain behavioral consequences.
Environmental motivation, environmental morale or pro-environmental attitudes are 37 highly relevant in understanding why people have a higher willingness to be involved in environmental protection. However, it should be noted that these social norms work stronger towards being a member rather than doing unpaid work in environmental organizations. Unpaid work is associated with higher opportunity costs which may help to explain such a difference. Finally, it should be noted that further investigations are required to gain a better understanding of what shapes individuals' environmental motivation. This would provide a better foundation to derive policy implications to promote, encourage and maintain a higher willingness to contribute to the environment. 
